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7 March 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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# Republic of the Congo




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## DAILY BRIEF

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Congo: The Tananarive round-table conference, scheduled to begin on 5 March, has been delayed to await the arrival of Kasavubu and Gizenga. There has been no further fighting between UN forces and the Congolese troops in Matadi and Banana, and both UN and Congolese authorities have reportedly agreed, for the time being, not to send reinforcements to the Lower Congo region. Further clashes seem likely, however, since Hammarskjold has insisted that UN forces must reoccupy Matadi, while Kasavubu's Foreign Minister Bomboko stated on 6 March that Matadi would not be returned to the UN pending a full investigation. Khartoum has announced that Sudanese troops will be withdrawn from the Congo because of alleged "grave mistakes" by UN officials during the recent clashes. (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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Argentina-Cuba: Argentina has decided to send special envoys to the United States and Cuban governments to seek means of alleviating "tension" between the two countries, despite its previous skepticism regarding the value of single-country mediation efforts. This action is probably intended to counter the apparent bid of Brazilian President Quadros for Latin American leadership through a play to leftist sentiment. Although officials have denied that domestic political considerations are responsible for the move, it is probably also influenced in part by the recent electoral triumph in Buenos Aires of a Socialist deputy who campaigned on a pro-Castro platform. [redacted] (Backup, Page 2) (b)(3)

Bolivia: President Victor Paz Estenssoro told American Ambassador Strom on 5 March that his government plans extensive arrests of Communist trade union leaders if the Confederation of Urban Teachers--which is reported under strong Communist influence--continues its strike for higher wages after the morning of 7 March. Anticipating possible violence, Paz is asking for tear-gas grenades, machine-gun ammunition, and small bombs for use in P-51 aircraft, from the United States. A substantial wage increase for teachers would strengthen wage demands from other government employees and impede the Paz government's drive to increase the country's production. The powerful unions of the nationalized tin mines are threatening to strike beginning 8 March. [redacted] (b)(3)

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## Argentina to Send Special Envoys to US and Cuba

In its reply to Cuba's circular note of late February soliciting sympathy from the various Latin American governments, Argentina announced its intention to send special envoys to the US and Cuban governments. Argentina apparently acted without consulting any of the other countries in advance.

A Foreign Ministry official said on 4 March that Argentina's initiative was based on the following considerations: 1) the Cuban situation remains a disturbing influence on the relations of other countries with the US; 2) a solution to the problem must be one which will eliminate Soviet and Communist influence in Cuba and, without arousing leftist elements in the hemisphere, stop Cuba's efforts to spread its revolution abroad; and 3) the overthrow of Castro by anti-Castro Cubans from the US or Guatemala would probably prompt criticism which would worsen inter-American relations.

Argentina's action, however, is probably intended primarily for its effect on public opinion both at home and abroad. Heretofore, Argentina has been the strongest critic of Cuba among the large Latin American countries and has maintained that the Cuban problem should be handled only through the OAS. Recently, however, President Frondizi expressed doubt that a vote for collective action would get even a slim majority.

Brazilian President Quadros' statements on Cuba increase pressure on Frondizi to make a gesture of his own on Cuba. A Brazilian press report on 4 March quoted Quadros as stating that "even supposing that there is Communist infiltration in the Cuban Government, the Castro revolution has our sympathies and we are not in any manner disposed to uphold any action contrary to the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs of other countries so long as Castro does not try to export Fidelismo."

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